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Share repurchases, Signaling effect and Implications for Corporate 
Governance: Evidence from India  
 
Abstract 
It is worth mentioning that a great deal of financial liberalization, privatization and 
internationalization policies in emerging economies have significantly increased the corporate restructuring 
activities like mergers, acquisitions, share repurchases, and stock splits, among others. Indeed, the activity that 
is investigated in this paper is ‘share repurchases’ and its effect on stock returns and price-to-earnings (P/E) 
ratio. More deeply, this paper will answer the research question–does a share repurchase offer abnormal 
returns around the announcement? Thus, it is performed in one of the Asian emerging markets–India. To do 
so, we use event-study method to examine abnormal returns and P/E signaling around the announcement of 
64 share repurchases, announced during 2008-2009. It is found that stock performance does not adequate, and 
notices lower as well as negative earnings during post-buyback period. Briefly, we conclude that share 
repurchases assure short-term returns, and observe lower P/E compared to pre-buyback period. In addition, 
we show some interesting results that derived from industrial and services sectors. The outcome of this paper 
would help financial analysts, financial advisors, corporate enterprises and regulatory bodies in designing 
policies on earnings distribution, managerial incentives, takeovers, and so forth of regulatory aspects.  
 
Keywords: Capital market studies; Corporate governance; Event-study; India; Price-to-earnings; 
Signaling effect; Share buybacks; Share repurchases; Stock returns; Undervaluation. 
 
1. Introduction  
The capital market is a creation of variety of investors who trade pecuniary assets in 
the form of equities, which is frictionless; however, investor’s perception technically depends 
on the market outlook (e.g. Majumder, 2011). Therefore, equity market is said to be an 
efficient in light of corporate event announcements, such as, accounting disclosures, stock 
splits, share repurchases (buybacks), right issues, bonus issues, mergers, acquisitions, 
takeovers, open offers, dividend issues, and so forth, which encloses new information1 and 
dissemination (e.g. Machiraju, 2007; Weston, Chung & Hoag, 1998). All these activities in 
turn–influence the functioning of stock market, which is treated as a signaling effect (e.g. 
Brown & Warner, 1985; Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, 1969). Share buyback is a corporate 
financial strategy, which involves capital reshuffle decisions (e.g. Benhamouda & Watson, 
2010; Thirumalvalavan & Sunitha, 2006), takeover defensive mechanism (e.g. Denis, 1990; 
Ginglinger & L'her, 2006; Liang, Chan, Lai & Wang, 2012), and puffiness in earnings-per-
                                                          
1 In other words, Majumder (2011) argues that the equity price today is an outcome of the combined effect of 
news/information released in the market. For example, post-election certainty, or uncertainty in policies of 
newly elected governments often induces a panic among investors, which may lead to a major downfall in 
equity prices, and we define these announcements are non-corporate, macroeconomic or institutional news.  
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share (EPS) whilst distributing surplus cash to the shareholders (e.g. Benhamouda & 
Watson, 2010). Indeed, undervaluation is the most important reason behind share 
repurchases (Ha, Hong & Lee, 2011). In a theory, firms frequently make use of equity 
repurchases to disclose information about stock undervaluation; moreover, it is a tactic for 
sending a bullish signal to the market (Jagannathan & Stephens, 2003). In particular, 
“signaling theory proposes that the credibility of a signal from a repurchase announcement 
increases when managers of the repurchasing firm are themselves exposed to risk of 
signaling failure” (Liu & Gombola, 1998, p. 30). In the perspective of corporate governance, 
information relating to share buybacks fully disclosed to shareholders (e.g. Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2012; Task Force Report, 2006). Evidently, most of the early research has 
documented positive signaling effect around share repurchase announcements (e.g. 
Comment & Jarrell, 1991; Gonzālez & Gonzālez, 2004; Hyderabad, 2009; Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok & Vermaelen, 1995; Kim, 2007; Padgett & Wang, 2007). 
Share repurchase activity has developed radically, and then fetched a major payment 
method since many years in the finance education, research and practice (e.g. Hung & Chen, 
2010; Stowe, McLeavey & Pinto, 2009). In our approach, if share buyback causes signaling 
effect, does it beneficial to the shareholders, or also causes double signaling power on the 
price-to-earnings (hereinafter, P/E) ratio? To address these queries, we examine 64 share 
repurchase programs announced by the Indian companies during 2008-2009. We apply the 
event-study method to check and investigate the debate does signaling effect or 
undervaluation is exhibited in India? If occurred, do Indian investors benefitted from share 
repurchases. We thus describe that share buybacks have been absent in respect of abnormal 
stock earrings during post-buyback period. We also report that stock behavior is not being 
a satisfactory, and notice lesser as well negative returns during post-buyback; hence, assure 
positive returns in the short-term. At the outset, this is an exclusive Indian study from the 
emerging economies group, which focuses on signaling effect in light of equity buybacks. Of 
course, we examine P/E behavior around buyback announcements. In addition, we suggest 
policy guidelines for strengthening corporate governance framework in view of repurchases. 
Conceptually, corporate restructuring is a long-term business strategy to boost 
shareholders value in terms of ownership structure, EPS, accounting earnings and abnormal 
stock returns, among others (e.g. Ray, 2010; Weston et al., 1998). It involves in two models: 
financial restructuring (e.g. changes in the capital structure), and operational reengineering 
(e.g. changes in the business model). Therefore, buybacks are part of the finance tactics. 
Thus, stock repurchase refers to the reversal of equity offerings (e.g. Kahle, 2002; 
Machiraju, 2007). Moreover, it has considered as one of the classic methods to lift 
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company's stock price. In particular, share repurchases distribute cash to the existing 
shareholders in exchange of firm's outstanding equity (e.g. Ray, 2010). Consequently, EPS 
is the major indicator for stock valuation, often higher-EPS leads to increase share price 
(e.g. Damodaran, 2002). Further, share buybacks help firms to discover EPS based 
compensation targets; specifically, number of shares repurchased in a quarter is the purpose 
of cash flow of the firm (Firth & Yeung, 2005). However, changes in EPS and volatility in 
stock may influence the P/E. Therefore, we examine both stock and P/E margins in the 
present paper. 
Typically, shareholders get an exit opportunity at premium price over the prevailing 
market price, whilst firms pursue vista to reduce its equity capital. Previous studies exhibit 
that the motives2 behind share buybacks are boosting market perception, showing rosier 
financials, benefitting from tax gains, and increasing the promoter's stake (e.g. Ginglinger & 
L'her, 2006; Webb, 2008). In the past twenty years, there has been a meteoric rise in 
employing share repurchases in the U.S. from US$5 billion in 1980 to US$349 billion in 
2005. By the end of March, 2010, the authorized buybacks have reached about US$68.5 
billion, which is 52 per cent of the US$125 billion in 2009 (Lu, Ozdaglar & Simchi-Levi, 
2010). Subsequently, U.S. has become the largest market for share buybacks, followed by 
the UK (Benhamouda & Watson, 2010). In the Indian setting, vigorous increase in the 
inflow of foreign equity investments is the key factor due to the established policies that are 
equivalent to international markets (see Dongre, 2012; Reddy, Nangia & Agrawal, 2012). 
Consequently, this inimitable rise has accredited the investors, for instance, foreign 
institutional investors and home-based mutual funds (Majumder, 2011). We then forward to 
present some regulatory aspects of share buybacks. 
In India, the financial option of share repurchases has been permitted from October 
31, 1998 (e.g. Banerjee & Chakraborty, 2004; [indiabudget.nic.in]). There were six buyback 
offers in 1999, eight in 2000, and then increased 22 in 2008-09. Since 1998, roughly 300 
firms have been practiced buyback offers (Hyderabad, 2009). According to Thomson 
Reuters report, India was the 15th most active nation in share buybacks globally, for 
example, Reliance Energy's US$885.9 million buyback offer, recorded as the biggest 
corporate event in Asia during 2008-09 (Economic Times, 2008).  
It is further necessary to comprehend the Indian buyback regulatory system and its 
consequences as a token of subject coverage. Early 90’s, the economy functioned in an 
environment that has regimented by government control and regulations, later moved to a 
                                                          
2 See, for example, Benhamouda and Watson (2010) investigate the motive behind 267 UK share repurchases 
during 2001-2004. 
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market-driven system (e.g. Machiraju, 2007; Reddy et al., 2012). Until the enactment of 
Companies (amendment) act of 1999, no company limited by shares, or no company limited 
by guarantee having a share capital buy its own securities unless the consequent reduction 
of capital has affected, and sanctioned pursuant to the provisions of sections 100 to 104, and 
402 of the act. However, the concept of share repurchases has proposed in the Companies 
Bill, 1977. Afterward, the Companies (amendment) Ordinance of 1998 promulgated on Oct 
31, 1998 containing the provisions on share buybacks, but it has not been passed. 
Thereafter, a new ordinance of 1999 was circulated on Jan 7, 1999. The new era of share 
buybacks has introduced in the Companies act of 1956 by the Companies (amendment) act, 
1999 in sections 77A, 77AA, and 77B. Accordingly, Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI) issued SEBI (Buyback of Securities) Regulations 1998, which is a running enactment 
(e.g. Banerjee & Chakraborty, 2004; Ray, 2010).  
1.1. Motivation and objective of the study 
We therefore present our motivation and objective of the study. The anonymous 
revolutionize in buybacks is considered as an opportunity to study the stock and P/E 
behavior around repurchase announcements. Thus, we are strongly motivated by the 
studies that corroborate diverse issues on share repurchases, for instance, signaling effect, 
anti-takeover method, earnings performance, information disclosure in light of corporate 
governance, and so forth (e.g. Comment & Jarrell, 1991; Denis, 1990; Dittmar, 2000; Fama 
& French, 2001; Grullon & Michaely, 2002; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012; Hribar, Jenkins & 
Johnson, 2006, Hung & Chen, 2010; Hyderabad, 2009; Jiraporn, 2006; Liang et al., 2012; 
Padgett & Wang, 2007; Peyer & Vermaelen, 2009; Task Force Report, 2006; Valenti, Luce 
& Mayfield, 2011; Weigand & Baker, 2009). Previous Indian studies (e.g. Thirumalvalavan 
& Sunitha, 2006) find sturdy signaling influence that reacted more positively around a given 
announcements. Nevertheless, they have not specified any insightful information to the 
investors, or stock broking firms–whether buybacks assure positive returns? In fact, no 
Indian study examined both stock volatility and P/E changes around repurchases. 
Therefore, we aim to test the significant changes in share price and P/E during pre-buyback 
and post-buyback period. More specifically, we offer policy guidelines on information 
disclosure and share buybacks in the view of corporate governance practices. In sum, our 
study adds some contribution to the share repurchases literature from the Asian emerging 
markets: India. 
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the review of earlier 
literature. Section 3 explains method and data. Section 4 discusses signaling results. Section 
5 outlines implications for corporate governance. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. Review of earlier contributions 
To understand the consequences of signaling effect around different corporate 
events, we present extensive literature that studied in western and emerging economies. 
Chen and Fraser (2010) estimate stock market prices in view of dividends, and earnings 
during 1965-2006 in 10 global markets. They suggest that expected earnings have 
significant power in driving stock prices in the markets of the U.S., the UK, Japan, Korea, 
and Malaysia, while expected dividends have relatively more influence on the indicators of 
Thailand, Taiwan, and Indonesia. In the course of share repurchases, most scholars reported 
on (in) developed markets, such as, the U.S., Canada, and Japan, may have different effects in 
markets with different degrees of development (Hung & Chen, 2010). Comment and Jarrell 
(1991), and Vermaelen (1981) find positive abnormal returns around share repurchase 
announcements, which they interpret it as a signal of undervaluation. In fact, subsequent 
scholars also indicate that undervaluation is the most frequent rationale for equity buybacks 
(e.g. Dittmar, 2000). In a similar study, Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) report long-term 
abnormal returns as a rectification of an overreaction to bad news prior to repurchases. We 
thus survey both past and recent contributions on share repurchases, and then presented in 
two groups: theoretical debate and signaling effect. 
2.1. Share repurchases: A theoretical debate 
Stock repurchases had gained recognition in the United States, and then engulfed 
European countries (e.g. France, Germany, Italy, and the UK), Australia, New Zealand, and 
Asian countries (e.g. China, India, Japan, Malaysia, and Taiwan). Thus, it is necessary to 
debate on various theoretical aspects that contemplate share buybacks: strategic financial 
decision of capital reshuffle (e.g. Benhamouda & Watson, 2010; Thirumalvalavan & Sunitha, 
2006), dividend declaration whilst paying excess cash flow to equity investors (e.g. Li & 
McNally, 2007), and information discrepancy between insiders, and outside owners (e.g. 
Kim & Varaiya, 2008). In particular, it is a takeover defensive tactic (e.g. Denis, 1990; 
Dittmar, 2000; Ginglinger & L'her, 2006); similar studies include connotation of legal 
restrictions, and governance issues (e.g. Cerveny, Wittlin, O'Brien & Trocchio, 2010; 
Gonzālez & Gonzālez, 2004; Harris & Ramsay, 1995; Hung & Chen, 2010; Jansson & 
Larsson-Olaison, 2010; Rau & Vermaelen, 2002). 
Capital structure reshuffle would be an important motivation while designing 
strategies for repurchases (Benhamouda & Watson, 2010). Indeed, stock repurchases allow 
the firm to buy back its own outstanding stock, adjusting the firm’s capital structure as well 
board composition (Webb, 2008). In particular, these programs are greater news when 
foreign institutional investors support a firm (Ginglinger & L’her, 2006). In exceptional 
Reddy, K. S., Nangia, V. K., & Agrawal, R. (2013). Share repurchases, signaling effect and implications for 
corporate governance: Evidence from India. Asia-Pacific Journal of Management Research and Innovation, 9(1), 
107-124. Sage Publications 
Page 7 of 30 
 
cases, shareholders do not favor management using surplus cash flows, although it may not 
distress the net present value of a firm (Jensen, 1986). Typically, excess capital utilized to 
buy back outstanding equity shares thus result in a positive market reaction. A firm usually 
repurchases its stock through open market at prevailing market value (Webb, 2008). Open 
market repurchases method is flexible; hence, it becomes an effective tool for administration 
purposes. These programs typically take place over a period of one year or more, and the 
firm can buy its own stock when they judge that it is undervalued (Stephens & Weisbach, 
1998). Li and McNally (2007) document that most organizations likely to go for share 
buybacks, if they have superior free cash flows, lesser market-to-book ratio, weaker prior 
stock performance, and insiders large shareholdings. Therefore, announcement returns 
strongly related to the private information possessed by company insiders. In this issue, 
Kim and Varaiya (2008) examine insider-timing assumption by inspecting insiders trading 
activities during share buybacks trading. They suspect that information discrepancy 
between insiders and outside owners of a buyback firm would create asymmetric prospects 
for insiders to do their trades in a period when the firm is truly engaged in buyback 
trading.3 
Most buyback firms tend to be hefty, and have greater disbursement ratio, which 
may lead distributing surplus cash to equity owners (Benhamouda & Watson, 2010); thus, 
Kahle (2002) evidence that larger offers attract superior market response. Firms in the U.S. 
have become less payout entities, but it has corresponded with a spectacular rise in share 
repurchases during 1978-1999 (Fama & French, 2001); hence, firms engage in repurchases 
trading more actively when the price falls in the issue market. Jansson and Larsson-Olaison 
(2010) state that Swedish firms do not repurchase stock to distribute excess cash, or fend off 
takeovers; hence, they do in-addition to dividends but not substitute. In a similar argument, 
buybacks are typically less profitable as there is no new capital coming into the firm, 
because they have the longest investment duration (Cumming & Johan, 2008).4 In the 
subject of defensive strategy, Denis (1990) examines the defensive changes in the corporate 
payout policy. Repurchase is an effective method for countering the hostile takeovers, as 
there is a high probability of the target firm maintaining independence. Likewise, buybacks 
may reduce the likelihood of a takeover, and trigger a decrease in firm value, thus likely to 
strengthen the controlling shareholders (Ginglinger & L'her, 2006). In a different motive, 
                                                          
3 However, information irregularity gives a possible unfair lead to insiders over outside owners, because 
insiders of a firm would be selling their equity holdings when the firm itself is supporting the price by buying 
back its own shares (Kim & Varaiya, 2008). 
4 Cumming and Johan (2008, p. 198) examine 518 exited venture capital backed firms in Canada during 1991-
2004. In a buyback exit, the entrepreneur repurchases the firm from the VC and there exists no issues arising 
from information asymmetry. 
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Dittmar (2000) suggests that buybacks use to counter the dilution effect of management and 
employee stock options. 
On the other hand, Gonzālez and Gonzālez (2004) analyze the consequences of legal 
restrictions on the size of repurchase program. They suggest that the obligation of a 
boundary on the amount of common stock favors the use of open market repurchases 
(OMRs), compared to other methods such as tender offer repurchases (TORs), and Dutch 
actions (DAs). Hence, TORs, and DAs are notably larger than OMRs (Comment & Jarrell, 
1991). In the cross-county aspects, Rau and Vermaelen (2002), and Rees (1996) document 
that UK buyback activities have lesser abnormal returns compared to the U.S. firms. Hence, 
there are two important factors causing lesser returns: the UK regulatory environment 
discourages share buybacks to take advantage of an undervalued stock price, and many 
buyback programs setup to allow pension funds to earn tax credits (e.g. Rau & Vermaelen, 
2002). Harris and Ramsay (1995) discuss the implications for regulating buybacks in the 
Australian market. Conversely, Gonzālez and Gonzālez (2004) describe that prevalence of 
corporate governance would be a motivation for examining stock reaction around buybacks 
in the Spanish market. Webb (2008) examines the relationship between the extent of share 
repurchases, and measures of corporate governance in the banking industry. Webb also 
states that corporate governance plays a vital role in both the market response, and 
strategic decisions. In the relevant issues of regulatory governance, Cerveny et al. (2010) 
find that changes in legal provisions affect buybacks in various aspects. Generally, in a 
theory, buybacks are guided by the intrinsic value of the share, which is privileged than the 
market price, when management purses the shares to be undervalued (Hung & Chen, 2010). 
However, for some companies, total cash distributions (dividends and repurchases) may be a 
more practical measure of return to investors than dividends alone (Stowe et al., 2009).5 
In sum, repurchase is a strategic finance choice, which is a strong motivational factor 
in various long-term business decisions: capital reshuffle (e.g. Baker, Powell & Veit, 2003; 
Benhamouda & Watson, 2010; Dixon, Palmer, Stradling & Woodhead, 2008; Webb, 2008),6 
signaling share undervaluation (e.g. Crawford & Wang, 2012; Ikenberry, Lakonishok & 
Vermaelen, 2000; Ikenberry & Vermaelen, 1996; Wansley, Lane & Sarkar, 1989),7 
                                                          
5 When a firm buyback its overvalued shares, consequently it dilutes the outstanding shares and shifts wealth 
from long-term shareholders to sellers (Stowe et al., 2009). 
6 In Dixon et al. (2008) survey, the authors find that the important motive behind share repurchases is “to 
achieve optimum capital reshuffle”, followed by to return excess cash to shareholders, to improve the 
company’s earnings per share, as a method of increasing the firms gearing, and because the company lacked 
sufficient investment opportunities to use available cash, among others presented in a 14-point measurement. 
7 In addition, Wansley et al. (1989) find that “to signal investors that managers are confident about the firm’s 
future” is also a motive behind share repurchases.   
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distributing surplus cash flows (e.g. Li & McNally, 2007), reducing agency costs (e.g. 
Jensen, 1986), takeover defensive strategy (e.g. Denis, 1990; Dittmar, 2000; Ginglinger & 
L'her, 2006; Liang et al., 2012; Neuhauser, Davidson & Glascock, 2011), and avoid dividend 
taxation (Baker et al., 2003).8 In Dittmar’s (2000) view, motive behind repurchases depends 
upon the firm specific situation. However, purpose for repurchases likely changes at the 
different stages of lifecycle (Liang et al., 2012).9 On the other hand, “judging from the 
financial press […] Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) are asked why firms repurchase stock, 
the most frequently mentioned reason is: improving EPS numbers” (as cited In Hribar et al., 
2006, p. 4). 
2.2. Share repurchases and signaling effect: The empirical debate   
We thus report our understanding on the signaling effect around repurchase 
announcements that has examined in various institutional settings. Theoretically, signaling 
power is the key elucidation for firms’ buyback activity (Ikenberry et al., 1995), and 
information is the most regularly encountered justification for stock repurchases causes 
signaling hypotheses (Stephens & Weisbach, 1998). Signaling effect consists in the swell of 
positive, or negative, when the investors could not discriminate the value of firm’s outlay 
opportunities (Gonzālez & Gonzālez, 2004). However, price reactions to the announcement 
in the last decade appear to be less sympathetic compared to previous findings (Ginglinger 
& L'her, 2006). Of course, volatility of stock price is the meticulous risk faced by investors 
(Kim, 2007), and individual stock return volatility was more than doubled during 1962-97 
(Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel & Xu, 2001). We describe the prominent reviews in light of 
signaling effect (e.g. Bartov, 1991; Comment & Jarrell, 1991; Grullon & Michaely, 2002; 
Kahle, 2002; Kim, 2007; Li & McNally, 2007; Padgett & Wang, 2007). In the Indian 
context, very few scholars focus on stock earnings around equity repurchases (CNI, 2009; 
Hyderabad, 2009; Thirumalvalavan & Sunitha, 2006). Thereafter, we also have reviewed 
special studies on bank buybacks (Webb, 2008), and the impact on accounting performance 
(Evans & Evans, 2001). 
Bartov (1991) analyses 150 announcements during 1986-92, find that buyback firms 
have higher book-to-market ratio, and higher proportion of institutional investors. In 
particular, Comment and Jarrell (1991) investigate the signaling hypotheses, and examine 
three methods of repurchasing stock, tender offers, Dutch auction, and open market repurchases. 
                                                          
8 Also, see the theoretical discussions with some international examples, for instance, what is the game plan for 
share repurchases (Stonham, 2002). 
9 Liang et al. (2012) find size, sales growth, ROA, and dividend-to-asset ratios are consistent with the life cycle 
process. They also explore that repurchase firms in the early stage tend to have considerably higher value-to-
price ratios, whereas firms in the later stage produce higher free cash flows. 
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They exhibit that fixed-price tender offers signaling the most information to investors, and 
least in case of open market repurchases. Oyon, Markides and Ittner (1994) examine 41 U.S. 
offers during 1971-1985, thus firms re-buying their shares do have a raise in earnings in the 
offer-year, and firms that make tender offer, do not happen earnings augment in the years 
following the buyback. Similarly, Ikenberry et al. (1995) hypothesize that stock repurchases 
primarily serve as a signaling mechanism, and thereby provide new information; study 
1,239 open market repurchases announced between 1980 and 1990. They indicate that 
investing in stock repurchase companies evidenced 12.1 per cent abnormal returns over 4 
years. For the U.S., Grullon and Michaely (2002) test the substitution effect between 
dividends and share repurchases for 15,843 firms during 1972-2000, thus average payout 
ratio was relatively constant in spite of decline in the dividend-payout ratio. Interestingly, 
Kahle (2002) examines how stock options affect the decision to repurchases. Kahle finds that 
managers repurchase to maximize their own wealth and fund employee stock options. 
Conversely, Kim (2007, p. 332) study the changes in daily return volatility associated 
with 905 open market offers during 1990-92. Thus, firms actively buy back their shares 
when the price falls that reduce daily return volatility. Li and McNally (2007) inspect the 
determinants of firms' repurchase decision, and the market reaction during 1987-2000. They 
find that market reacts more positively when stocks undervalued, and initiates new 
repurchase programs. Chua (2010) shows that mean cumulative market-adjusted returns for 
the period [0, +1], and [-1, +1] is substantial at 1.25 per cent, and 1.33 per cent 
respectively; whereas, weakly-performed firms exhibit the positive, and significant for the 
period [0, +1]. More recently, Liang et al. (2012) studies the 4,285 offers in the U.S. during 
1990–2006. They find that motive for repurchases alter depending on the firm’s lifecycle 
stage.10 Specifically, a firm in the growth stage tends to pursue a buyback plan to signal its 
undervalued stock; whereas a firm in the mature stage is prone to repurchase to distribute 
surplus free cash flows. In fact, Liang et al. find five-day abnormal return was about 3.44 per 
cent.11 Likewise, Chen and Wang (2012) investigate 4,710 U.S. repurchases between 1990 
and 2007. They find that both initial and long run stock price reactions are significantly less 
                                                          
10 However, firm’s growth opportunity situation is strongly influenced by its development stage in the firm’s 
lifecycle (Liang et al., 2012). 
11 On the one hand, one can observe the fruitful results on share repurchases in 33 economies (see Haw, Ho, 
Hu & Zhang, 2011). On the other hand, one can study the pattern of long-run returns following open market 
share repurchases, for instance, in Canadian (McNally & Smith, 2007) and American (Yook, 2010) markets.   
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favorable for constrained firms than for unconstrained. They also display inferior post-
buyback abnormal returns for constrained compared to unconstrained firms.12 
Similarly, for the UK, Padgett and Wang (2007) inspect the short-term signaling 
power of open market share repurchases during 1999-2004. The 5-day (1.13%) and 11-day 
(1.21%) abnormal returns are statistically significant.13 For France, Ginglinger and L'her 
(2006) evaluate 363 repurchases during 1998-99. They find positive market reaction; hence, 
it depends upon the corporate governance and market structure measures. They also 
observe overall positive reaction of 0.57 per cent (0, +1). For Spain, Gonzālez and Gonzālez 
(2004) analyze 58 open market repurchases and 24 sellbacks. They notice 1.74 per cent of 
abnormal returns (-1, +1), 2.04 per cent (-2, +2), and 1.95 per cent (-3, +3). 
Contrary to the above observations, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) observe negative 
abnormal returns during the period preceding buyback program, which indicates that firm’s 
normally buy back when their stock price is undervalued. For Malaysia, Ramakrishnan, 
Ravindran and Ganisen (2007) assess share buybacks during 1999–2006, and find positive 
effects to share prices during buyback and after buyback contrasted to pre-buyback. Firth 
and Yeung (2005) examine various characteristics of open market share buybacks in Hong 
Kong. They suggest that firms initiating buybacks have excess cash flow, and are 
undervalued. They also find that market-adjusted returns contiguous the first share 
buyback are a task of undervaluation14. In Taiwanese market, Hung and Chen (2010, p. 109) 
analyze the undervaluation of 1,145 repurchases during 2000-06. They explore that higher 
the upper bound of the declared price range announced, the more undervalued the stock 
price, and the more certainly the market reacts afterward, especially in the long-term. 
Particularly in bank-related firms, Webb (2008) has undertaken 224 repurchases 
during 2002-04, and exhibits positive signaling. Webb has reported 0.85 per cent of AAR 
on 0 window, conversely CAR is 0.41 per cent. In the subject of accounting performance, 
Evans and Evans (2001) compare accounting performance of repurchasing companies and 
non-repurchasing companies. They notice that performance of repurchasing companies fails 
to improve in the post-announcement period.  
In the Indian context, we found few scholars that investigate share repurchases in 
the aftermath of SEBI (Buyback of Shares) Regulations, 1998. Thirumalvalavan and Sunitha 
                                                          
12 Depending on the financial constraint measure, the three-day abnormal returns for constrained firms range 
from 0.23 per cent to 0.75 per cent, which is lower than the average abnormal returns of 0.92 per cent to 1.83 
per cent for unconstrained firms (Chen & Wang, 2012). 
13 See the European literature on share purchases (Crawford & Wang, 2012; Lee, Ejara & Gleason, 2010; von 
Eije & Megginson, 2008).   
14 It is usually proxied by prior abnormal stock returns and the number of shares acquired (Firth & Yeung, 
2005). 
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(2006) test the signaling effect of buyback and dividend announcements for 22 firms during 
2002-04, find abnormal returns across various repurchase levels. Their results describe that 
market was reacted more favorably to repurchases compared to dividends. An individual 
research organization, CNI (2009) examines 22 buybacks during 2008-09. CNI corroborate 
that 50 per cent of the companies have reported their post-buyback share prices decline by 
50 per cent. In the recent past, Hyderabad (2009) considers 68 repurchases, reports that 
AAR is 2.83 per cent, and CAR is 6 per cent on the announcement date. 
However, at the outset, it is our job to find what the knowledge gap in the 
aforementioned literate is. First, we have not found much empirical work on share buybacks 
with respect to Indian market; in fact, an extensive literature (we did in this paper). Second, 
both western and emerging literatures do not examine the P/E behavior around share 
repurchase announcements. Thus, we study P/E behavior in our paper. In addition, we 
study sector-wise signaling. Lastly, we try to establish a connection between signaling and 
corporate governance, and offer lawful implications for institutional progress.    
2.3. Signaling hypotheses development 
With this literature backdrop, we develop signaling hypotheses to counterpart the 
objective of the study. In a practice, firms persuade investors in view of undervaluation of 
their share price; therefore, it is imperative to study the signaling effect of repurchase 
announcements. The signaling hypotheses15 imply new and affirmative information about 
the firm’s future earnings prospects (Hung & Chen, 2010).16 For instance, “research has 
shown that equity cash flows–dividends, share repurchases and equity issues–are perceived 
by investors as signals of management’s assessment of a firm’s performance and prospects” 
(Dixon et al., 2008, p. 889). Earlier scholars have shown that there exist positive abnormal 
returns around such announcements (e.g. Comment & Jarrell, 1991). Whereas the majority 
of earlier research pursued various theories on share buybacks, such as, information signaling 
hypotheses (e.g. Ikenberry et al., 1995; Peyer & Vermaelen, 2009), and free cash flow hypotheses 
(e.g. Grullon & Michaely, 2002).17 More specifically, information signaling hypotheses 
suggests that the firm has an enticement to repurchase their own stock as a better self-
investment when their share price is undervalued (Liang et al., 2012). Undertaking the 
                                                          
15 Information signaling hypotheses is normally based on the idea that asymmetric information between 
insiders and outsiders causes the firm’s stock to be mispriced (Liang et al., 2012). In light of free cash flow 
hypotheses, Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) describe that share buybacks condense the amount of free 
cash flow under the control of firm. 
16 In case of underpricing‒a negative price reaction during pre-buyback period (Hung & Chen, 2010, p. 104). 
17 For instance, “according to the undervaluation hypothesis, repurchases are used by managers to reveal 
information about equity undervaluation. If managers believe that the firm is undervalued relative to their 
superior private information, then they may attempt to disclose this potentially value-increasing information 
by repurchasing the company’s stock” (as cited In Ha et al., 2011, p. 521). 
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recommendations, and views of Crawford and Wang (2012), Ginglinger and L'her (2006), 
Gonzālez and Gonzālez (2004), Hyderabad (2009), Ikenberry et al. (2000), Lee et al. (2010), 
Li and McNally (2007), Lim and Park (2011) and Webb (2008), we develop the following 
hypotheses to achieve the goal of our study. In this setting, we predict that open market 
buybacks produce positive stock returns and P/E, which is similar to Hyderabad (2009). 
The hypotheses are as follows.   
Hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference between stock returns during pre-buyback period.  
Hypothesis 2: There is no significant disparity between stock returns during post-buyback period. 
Hypothesis 3: There is no significant difference between stock returns and P/E during pre-buyback period.  
Hypothesis 4: There is no significant deviation between stock returns and P/E during post-buyback period.  
 
3. Method and data 
3.1. Event-study method 
Capital market efficiency is the key supposition underlying the use of finance theory, 
and diverse techniques in event studies (e.g. Brown & Warner, 1985; Fama et al., 1969; 
Johnson, 1998; Johnson, Natarajan & Rappaport, 1985).18 In a theory, earnings management 
applies around corporate events: IPOs, management buyouts, stock repurchases, mergers, 
acquisitions and accounting disclosures, among others (e.g. Cohen & Zarowin, 2010).19 
Buybacks usually employ by the firms to give some information to the stock market; thus, 
there is a need to study the signaling effect (e.g. Ginglinger & L'her, 2006; Hyderabad, 
2009; Ikenberry et al., 1995; Li & McNally, 2007), and its impact on the wealth of 
shareholders in terms of P/E earnings. We then apply event study method (e.g. Gonzālez & 
Gonzālez, 2004; Padgett & Wang, 2007) to compute abnormal returns, and percentage of 
changes in P/E. The price changes, or returns on each day for each firm has computed by 
comparing closing price of two days, i.e. current and previous day, and dividing the 
difference by closing price of the previous day. The same approach is employed while 
computing the changes in P/E. 
We select (both even and odd: chosen anonymously; of course, after reviewing 
methodology section in the previous studies, e.g. Hyderabad, 2009) T1, T3, T10, T30, T50, 
T70, T90, and T110 event periods. The event period 110-day means, 110 days before and 
after the opening date of buyback program; therefore, opening date of buyback is designated 
                                                          
18 Johnson et al. (1985) argue that applications of finance theory provide better measures of firm performance 
compare to accounting-based techniques. See Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay (1997) for basic econometrics of 
financial markets. Hence, our model is slightly different from the standard methods that explain windows.  
19 Cohen and Zarowin (2010) examine both real and accrual-based earnings management activities around 
1,511 U.S. seasoned equity offerings between 1987 and 2006. They document how the propensity for firms to 
tradeoff real versus accrual-based earnings management activities around SEOs varies cross-sectionally.  
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as zero (0). We found that expected returns are calculated using different asset pricing 
models like capital asset pricing model, market model, market-adjusted model, and so forth. 
On the other hand, we also found some recent studies that use market index for estimating 
expected returns (e.g. Reddy, Nangia & Agrawal, 2012). Therefore, we use BSE-SENSEX 
Index as a market index to estimate market returns.  
We compute simple returns using the following standard formulae (e.g. Hyderabad, 2009).  
      
          
     
  
Where, Rit – simple returns of a stock; CPt – closing price of a stock; CPt-1 – previous 
day closing price of a stock.  
Then, we compute market returns. 
      
            
      
  
Where, Rmt – market returns for the BSE-Sensex; CPmt – closing index value; CPmt-1 – 
previous day closing index value. Further, abnormal returns are computed as follows. 
                
ARit – excess returns for a given stock. 
Subsequently, an average abnormal return for each stock is computed. 
       
 
 
       
AARt – average abnormal returns; n – sample size. In order to examine the cumulative effect 
of events, we produce cumulative abnormal returns. 
            
CARt – cumulative abnormal returns. 
In fact, we (could) regress the data using cross-sectional regression models but it is 
not being performed in our paper due to incompleteness and readiness of share repurchase 
disclosures in India. Hence, we compute analysis of variance (ANOVA–one-way) to locate 
any significant difference between the means of stock returns and P/E, and it is appropriate 
for our sample size, also to accomplish the objective of this paper.  
3.2. Data collection 
Relevant information on share buybacks is collected from four sources. Sample size 
is extracted from SEBI,20 and Capital Market’s Capitaline database in which open market 
                                                          
20 SEBI is a capital market regulatory body located in Mumbai, India. Relevant information on market 
regulatory and provisions of various acts are available at [http://www.sebi.gov.in].  
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share buybacks are included, during 2008-2009. Subsequently, market information is 
collected with reference to commencement date (opening date) of buyback program. The 
statistical data: daily share prices, market index, daily turnover, and P/E for the given 
sample are absorbed from the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) online database, and Centre for 
Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE)-Prowess database. We then sort and select 64 buybacks 
whose complete information is available during the sample period (see Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
4. Results and discussions 
4.1. Descriptive statistics for stock returns and P/E   
Share repurchases typically regarded as a good signal to the stock market (Liang et 
al., 2012).21 Empirically, these announcements report abnormal returns around 2 per cent to 
3 per cent (e.g. Comment & Jarrell 1991). Most event studies compute simple and market-
adjusted returns around repurchase announcements. In the Malaysian market, Ramakrishna 
et al. (2007) found positive effects of price returns during- and post-buyback compared to 
pre-buyback period. In case of India, Hyderabad (2009) notices that AAR on the date of 
announcement is 2.83 per cent, while CAR is about 6 per cent. Table 2 shows descriptive 
statistics for stock returns (see Panel A) and P/E changes (see Panel B). We find that stock 
returns during post-buyback tumbled as well negative that can be observed on -3rd window 
(1.36%), and -1st window (0.21%) compared to +1, and +3 windows. 
Interestingly, a highest stock return (1.36%) is noticed during pre-buyback. Further, 
we observe AAR and CAR during both the periods. AAR reports extremely a good result 
on -3rd window (1.49%), and -1st window (0.31%). It thus infers that stock has greatly 
performed compared to market returns. In contrast, AAR has fell-down by 0.73 per cent, 
and 1.04 per cent on +1st, and +3rd windows respectively during post-buyback. Similarly, 
CAR results as good as AAR in the respective windows. However, we suspect that the post-
buyback investor sentiments have not been sympathetic with buyback offering companies in 
India, because repurchases strategically help in rebuilding the capital structure to prevent 
takeovers from rivalry firms, and facilitate to increase proprietors stake in the firm. Figure 1 
shows graphical picture on stock returns, AAR and P/E changes. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] and [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
We therefore discuss P/E changes. Stock performance shows lower returns; 
similarly, P/E also has affected. We observe that P/E during pre-buyback, which is on -3rd, 
                                                          
21 Liang et al. (2012) argue that firms in the early stage face more information asymmetry; therefore, firms 
have greater incentive to repurchase shares due to mispricing than firms do in the later stage. 
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and -1st windows report higher change compared to +1, and +3 windows (0.72%, 0.38%, 
0.10%, and -0.26% respectively). If we observe closely both stock and P/E changes during 
post-buyback (e.g. see Table 2 and Figure 1), thus P/E has seriously affected compared to 
stock returns. Additionally, we also have shown number of firms with positive returns. Of 
course, it would be concrete evidence on buyback programs in the emerging nations like 
India. In other words, a share repurchase also influences the P/E behavior (not only stock) 
around a given announcement. Therefore, it is proven that there would be significant P/E 
signaling during post-buyback.   
We then forward to test the hypotheses. Table 3 depicts the results for one-way 
analysis of variance with respect to stock returns and P/E changes. We further divide the 
outcome into four panels, Panel A, B, C, and D. Panel A describes inference with regard to 
pre-buyback stock returns. Thus, P-value 0.19607 is greater than the significant α level 0.05 
(at 95% confidence level). As a result, we accept the null hypothesis (H1), and interpret that 
there is no significant mean difference among stock returns during pre-buyback period. 
Panel B outlines the result of post-buyback stock returns, and find that P-value is greater 
than α level 0.05, i.e. 0.42976. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis (H2), and infer that 
there is no significant difference among the means of stock returns during post-buyback.     
Conversely, Panel C and Panel D describe P/E changes in both the periods 
respectively. Likewise Panel A and B, we observe similar changes for P/E. In the Panel C 
and D, P-value is greater than α level 0.05, i.e. 0.82203, and 0.43288 respectively. We also 
accept the null hypothesis in case of P/E (H3, and H4), and infer that there is no significant 
difference among the means of P/E changes in both the periods. In this setting, one could 
conclude that share repurchase programs not only influence the stock prices but also cause 
the P/E signaling around announcements. In addition to the above results, we also compute 
Pearson’s correlation; however, significant results have not been found.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2. Sector-wise signaling results 
Table 4 shows sector-wise proportional results with respect to stock returns and 
P/E. For superior analysis and discussions, we divide the sample size into two sectors. 
Discussion A represents a sample of 42, consists production, manufacturing, chemicals, and 
textiles that refers to Industrial, Production, and Machinery (IPM). On the other hand, 
Discussion B consist a sample of 22 scripts refers to IT, Finance, and Services (IT&FS) that 
includes information technology, banking, finance and other allied services. 
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In Group A, we observe that the stock returns in IPM during pre-buyback are 
healthier compared to post-buyback. It is noticed that 0.96 per cent of stock returns on -3rd 
window, which is the highest stock return; similarly, P/E turned positively. During post-
buyback period, P/E has declined by 29.03 per cent on +70th window, which is noticed a 
highest collapse in the sector. Group B shows services sector performance during both the 
periods. Stock returns on -3rd, and -1st windows, i.e. 2.14 per cent, and 0.82 per cent is 
higher than +1, and +3 windows during post-buyback; similar results reported for P/E in 
the respective periods. In addition, we also have shown number of firms with positive 
returns. Among these results, IT&FS has performed extremely vigorous compared to IPM 
during both the periods. In brief, share buybacks have affected the industrial sector 
negatively, though service sector has shown subordinate results especially during post-
buyback. Therefore, we confer that services sector repurchases usually outperform the 
industrial sector. However, our results are strictly restricted to India. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] and [Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
5. Implications for corporate governance 
We found few studies that exclusively focus on share repurchases and corporate 
governance. Hence, we do not establish any object that corporate governance affects share 
repurchases and vice-a-versa. Thus, we recommend the following studies that are based in 
Singapore (Chua, 2010), Sweden (Jansson & Larsson-Olaison, 2010), and the U.S. (Kim & 
Varaiya, 2008), which imparts the knowledge on information disclosure, repurchase 
announcements and corporate governance practices. To propose legal implications in light 
of buybacks and corporate governance, we follow various guidelines that have suggested in 
different institutional settings (Chen & Wang, 2012; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012; Hung & 
Chen, 2010; Jansson & Larsson-Olaison, 2010; Jiraporn, 2006; Kadir & Muhamad, 2012; 
Task Force Report, 2006; Webb, 2008). 
To instruct the awareness on share buybacks and corporate governance, Jiraporn 
(2006) states that firms tend to repurchase less stock where shareholder rights are weaker. 
The author also argues that firms with weak shareholder rights are better able to develop, 
and preserve more cash within the firm. Kim and Varaiya (2008) describe that insufficient 
disclosure on open market share repurchases in the U.S.; in most cases, outside shareholders 
have no knowledge of whether their firm employs repurchase trades. They also evidence 
that insiders do increase the net number of shares sold in a quarter, when the firm engaged 
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in share buyback trading.22 Webb (2008) examines the relationship between stock 
repurchases and corporate governance on 224 firms during 2002-04. Board structure and 
executive stock ownership do not influence the market response. In particular, insider 
equity has less influence on repurchases. In a recent study, Jansson and Larsson-Olaison 
(2010) suggest that corporate governance affect stock repurchasing behavior. They suggest 
that diversity in national and firm-level corporate governance consider in order to 
accurately assessing the outcomes of regulatory reforms. In a relevant observation, Hung 
and Chen (2010) explore a weaker signaling power of the legal price range, because 
repurchasing firms usually set the price range based on their own specific considerations, 
but not on the legal criteria. More recently, Chen and Wang (2012) describe that buybacks 
result a decline in corporate liquidity for repurchasing firms, whereas for constrained firms, 
reduced liquidity can be detrimental to shareholders wealth. Specifically, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2012, p. 220) argue that healthier disclosure requirements may exaggerate 
agency problems, and allied costs, including executive rewards. Further, improved 
disclosure provides benefits, but it also entails costs, for example, executive pay, and the 
distortions in managerial behavior.  
With this literature support, we suggest some lawful policy guidelines for Indian 
regulatory framework in the view of share repurchases. In the given country perspective, 
corporate governance related listing requirements are largely based on the 
recommendations of the Cadbury and Higgs Reports, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Further, 
improvements in corporate governance practices seem mostly to be a voluntary (Task Force 
Report, 2006). Moreover, this agenda has undergone a stretched drive from ratifying the 
Companies Act, 1956 through the Companies Bill, 2009 (Singh, Kumar & Uzma, 2011),23 
and New Companies Act 2011-12. The Task Force Report also states that share buybacks 
must disclose full-information to the given shareholders. We thus observe that buybacks, 
and corporate governance is a new research paradigm observed in the recent years, which 
has examined by few academic scholars, committees, and groups. Therefore, Indian scholars 
have greater opportunity to focus on the emerging issues that are relevant to governance at 
large: shareholding pattern, information transparency, and disclosure on buyback programs, 
                                                          
22 Insiders usually get an incentive to sell when a firm supports the price by repurchasing its own shares (Kim 
& Varaiya, 2008). 
23 Radical changes have taken place since the 1991 liberalization policy; they include the elimination of the 
office of Controller of Capital Issues, and the introduction of the free market-pricing regime for security issues. 
Thereafter, SEBI was established pursuant to the enactment of the SEBI Act for all aspects of capital market 
activities (Singh et al., 2011). 
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insider trading,24 announcements, and stock returns. For instance, the given country should 
amend key securities laws relating to insider trading, corporate ownership and institutional 
ownership pattern, among others, which can be similar to Malaysia (Kadir & Muhamad, 
2012). In fact, it can be practiced internally and externally while commencing share 
repurchases, thus may help regulators while investigating scandals, wrong information, and 
insider trading activities. On the other hand, a better corporate payout policy in financial 
restructuring models like repurchases or dividends, would control insider activity and 
improve firms’ earnings and managerial incentives, as well (e.g. Douglas, 2007; Weigand & 
Baker, 2009). Lastly, it is important that advanced corporate governance policies, rules or 
regulations are essential both for high firm performance and for public good (e.g. Valenti et 
al., 2011). In addition, there must be a Comprehensive Corporate Governance Mechanism for 
dealing major financial restructuring events, such as, acquisitions and takeovers (e.g. Indian 
Takeover Code, a review by Reddy, Nangia & Agarawal, 2011), valuation guidelines (e.g. as 
suggested in Reddy, Agrawal & Nangia, 2013), and related matters of ownership structure, 
board meetings and corporate disclosures. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Share repurchases have become one of the important research areas in corporate 
finance discipline, which imparts strong considerations for strategic corporate policy. Since 
1998, many Indian firms have announced significant number of share buyback programs. 
We therefore examined the signaling effect (both stock returns and P/E ratio) around share 
repurchase announcements. In our study, we find that buyback offers have not been showed 
significant abnormal stock earrings during post-buyback period. More specifically, we study 
the effect of given announcements in both industrial and services sectors. Further, it 
concludes that lower stock returns are observed during post-event windows of industrial 
sector whereas similar stock returns are reported in both pre- and post-buyback for services 
sector. Of course, we strongly accept earlier studies, and suggest that Indian buyback 
announcement results found to be lower as well negative during post-event days but assure 
positive returns in the short-term (e.g. Ginglinger & L'her, 2006; Padgett & Wang, 2007; 
Ramakrishnan et al., 2007; Thirumalvalavan & Sunitha, 2006). By contrast, lower abnormal 
returns and P/E are reported during post-buyback period. We then conclude that buybacks 
                                                          
24 The meaning of insider trading is that “buying or selling of shares by people who know, or is in possession 
of certain information about the shares and the information, is not yet released to the public. The information 
is of such a nature that if known to the public would affect the price of the shares […]. For example, a director 
who sells all his shares shortly before the announcement that the company suffers a large loss” (Kadir & 
Muhamad, 2012, pp. 78-79). Also, see Firth, Leung & Rui (2010). 
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offered by Indian-based listed firms assure short-term returns and observe lower P/E in the 
aftermath of announcements. Our study has strong implications to the existing literature on 
share buybacks. In addition (as a part of academic research), we have suggested few legal 
guidelines for improving the corporate governance framework in the view of information 
disclosure and insider trading that corroborates the given share repurchases. 
Authors thus put forward some limitations to the study. First, the work presented in 
this paper has considered the period of two years, i.e. 2008-2009. Second, sample is a 
limitation; due to less number of buyback firms, we have limited scope to generalize the 
results in industry-wise, though results are reported in sector-wise, i.e. industrial and 
services sectors. Lastly, we have not been performed any statistical tests for sector-wise/ 
industry-wise results due to less sample size (e.g. see Table 1). However, a strategic intent 
behind share repurchases in the Indian capital market, factors that affect lower returns 
during post-buyback period, which deserve future research. In fact, most academic literature 
on share repurchases does not focus on valuation, thus focusing on institutional features, 
and other important economic issues, such as, agency effect, and taxation effects of post-
repurchases are some of the thrust areas for doing further research (e.g. Stowe et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, scholars can investigate the essential areas in corporate finance, for example, 
regarding stock signaling which is the most powerful financial restructuring announcement 
from a given set of activities: accounting disclosures, buybacks, dividends, mergers, 
acquisitions and takeovers. 
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Table 1:  
Number of share buybacks: Industry-wise breakup 
Industry/Sector 2009 2008 Sample  Industry/Sector 2009 2008 Sample  
Apparels & Accessories 3 1 4 IT Consulting & 
Software 
3 4 7 
Auto Tyres, Parts & 
Equipment 
1 2 3 Personal Care Products  1 1 
BPO/KPO 1  1 Pharmaceuticals 2 5 7 
Broadcasting & Cable TV 1  1 Plastic Products and 
Furniture 
2 1 3 
Cement & Cement 
Products 
1 1 2 Publishing 2  2 
Coal  1 1 Reality, Construction & 
Electric Utilities 
2 2 4 
Commodity Chemicals 2 1 3 Specialty Chemicals 2  2 
Exploration, Production, 
Oil Equipment & Services 
2 2 4 Sugar  1 1 
Financial Services 
(NBFC's) 
2 2 4 Textiles 1  1 
Industrial Goods and 
Gasses 
 2 2 Telecom Equipment & 
Cables 
3 2 5 
Industrial Machinery, 
Iron & Steel/Interm. 
products 
4 1 5 Transportation - 
Logistics 
 1 1 
Final sample 34 30 64 
Notes: Industry classification is done with respect to prevailing stock information on Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) located in 
Mumbai, India [available at http://www.bseindia.com]; Sample period is based on calendar year. 
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Table 2:  
Descriptive statistics of stock returns and P/E changes during pre-buyback and post-buyback period 
 
Pre-buyback period Post-buyback period 
−110 −90 −70 −50 −30 −10 −3 −1 +1 +3 +10 +30 +50 +70 +90 +110 
Panel A: Stock returns 
Mean 0.10 0.75 0.37 -0.46 0.14 -0.35 1.36 0.21 0.01 -0.65 1.24 -0.39 -0.13 0.27 -0.37 0.53 
Median -0.03 -0.22 0.25 -0.20 -0.33 -0.60 0.86 0.41 -0.03 -0.38 0.16 -0.38 -0.02 0.41 -0.38 0.10 
Standard deviation 2.93 5.49 3.95 4.12 5.08 4.06 4.48 4.83 3.28 3.15 5.45 2.95 3.73 3.49 2.99 4.40 
Kurtosis 1.40 7.95 0.92 0.94 3.56 1.67 11.13 1.72 0.79 -0.46 3.88 1.29 0.52 3.52 3.72 5.87 
Skewness -0.05 2.44 0.33 -0.07 1.53 0.20 2.58 -0.44 0.13 0.00 1.69 -0.12 0.23 -0.83 0.40 1.53 
Minimum -8.97 -7.39 -9.92 -11.79 -7.70 -12.98 -4.78 -16.48 -8.02 -7.64 -10.32 -8.88 -8.92 -13.25 -9.42 -10.34 
Maximum 8.81 25.15 10.92 9.30 20.00 10.06 24.51 12.62 9.96 6.27 19.92 7.00 9.99 8.16 11.23 17.61 
AAR -0.11 0.56 -0.39 -0.35 0.43 -0.97 1.49 0.31 -0.73 -1.04 0.98 -0.47 0.14 -0.31 -0.41 0.24 
CAR -6.80 35.58 -25.18 -22.11 27.24 -61.86 95.53 19.97 -47.03 -66.84 62.83 -30.20 9.23 -19.52 -26.53 15.31 
NFPR 32 28 37 29 27 27 37 34 32 25 37 27 32 38 26 35 
Panel B: P/E changes 
Mean 0.83 0.42 0.65 -0.44 -0.33 -0.13 0.72 0.38 0.10 -0.26 0.70 -0.42 -0.20 -19.71 -0.22 -0.11 
Median 0.00 -0.21 0.37 -0.19 -0.22 -0.37 0.07 0.47 0.00 -0.30 0.15 -0.39 -0.13 -0.07 -0.30 0.00 
Standard deviation 5.84 6.29 3.83 4.12 9.97 4.07 4.64 4.83 3.36 4.16 5.58 4.66 3.69 156.21 2.85 6.58 
Kurtosis 35.36 8.78 1.00 0.91 27.06 1.59 10.97 1.78 0.83 8.95 4.77 21.14 0.57 63.80 2.08 21.68 
Skewness 5.16 0.01 0.28 -0.06 -3.81 0.07 2.29 -0.53 0.18 1.91 0.34 -3.41 0.18 -7.98 -0.14 -3.01 
Minimum -8.80 -27.53 -9.59 -11.78 -64.08 -12.98 -9.89 -16.44 -8.12 -7.67 -19.92 -28.64 -8.90 -1248.94 -9.38 -39.68 
Maximum 40.77 22.23 10.70 9.15 23.45 10.07 24.50 12.58 9.96 20.64 19.48 8.88 9.99 23.45 8.56 17.59 
NFPR 34 30 41 31 30 29 34 37 33 29 36 28 32 32 27 34 
No. of observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
Notes: AAR refers to average abnormal returns, and CAR refers to cumulative abnormal returns; NFPR refers to number of firms with positive returns; of course, we have included ‘zero 
value’; No. (Number) of observations are equal in both stock returns and P/E changes. 
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Table 3:  
Analysis of variance (ANOVA–one way) results 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Panel A: Pre-buyback Stock returns 
Between groups 329.17 15 21.9445 1.29761 0.1961* 1.6763 
Within groups 17046.87 1008 16.9115 
   
Total 17376.04 1023 
    
Panel B: Post-buyback Stock returns 
Between groups 23760.61 15 1584.0407 1.02142 0.4297* 1.6763 
Within groups 1563222.13 1008 1550.8156 
   
Total 1586982.75 1023 
    
Panel C: Stock returns and P/E during Pre-buyback 
Between groups 263.25 15 17.5501 0.66324 0.8220* 1.6763 
Within groups 26673.07 1008 26.4613 
   
Total 26936.32 1023 
    
Panel D: Stock returns and P/E during Post-buyback 
Between groups 23545.49 15 1569.6991 1.01845 0.4328* 1.6763 
Within groups 1553595.94 1008 1541.2658 
   
Total 1577141.43 1023 
    
Notes: (*), the asterisk refers to that  we accept the null hypothesis (H1, H2, H3 & H4) at 95% confidence level, because P-value is greater than α level 0.05, i.e. P>0.05. 
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Table 4:  
Stock and P/E signaling results of industrial and service sectors during pre-buyback and post-buyback period 
 
−110 −90 −70 −50 −30 −10 −3 −1 +1 +3 +10 +30 +50 +70 +90 +110 
Group A: Industrial, Production and Machinery (IPM) – Number of observations: 42 
Mean of stock returns 0.23 0.17 0.16 -0.51 0.43 -0.34 0.96 -0.11 -0.18 -0.20 0.80 -0.62 -0.15 0.61 -0.45 1.33 
Standard deviation 2.56 3.04 3.34 3.47 5.28 2.96 2.42 4.53 3.39 2.68 3.65 2.30 3.53 3.14 3.24 4.55 
Mean of P/E 1.34 -0.15 0.33 -0.70 -0.35 -0.34 0.74 -0.02 -0.26 0.27 0.95 -1.05 -0.24 -29.03 -0.20 0.38 
Standard deviation 6.64 5.18 3.21 3.45 11.75 2.96 2.48 4.54 3.35 4.18 3.63 4.91 3.49 190.58 3.06 7.60 
NFPR (stock) 21 21 23 17 18 18 26 24 19 17 25 17 19 27 15 27 
NFPR (P/E) 23 23 25 17 20 18 25 25 20 20 25 18 19 22 16 26 
Group B: IT & Financial Services (IT&FS) – Number of observations: 22 
Mean of stock returns -0.17 1.86 0.77 -0.36 -0.42 -0.36 2.14 0.82 0.35 -1.50 2.08 0.04 -0.09 -0.37 -0.21 -1.00 
Standard deviation 3.47 8.18 4.80 5.06 4.50 5.53 6.73 5.21 2.95 3.70 7.66 3.80 4.00 3.93 2.33 3.50 
Mean of P/E -0.16 1.52 1.24 0.05 -0.31 0.26 0.68 1.16 0.79 -1.26 0.21 0.79 -0.13 -1.91 -0.26 -1.04 
Standard deviation 3.46 7.77 4.66 5.06 4.59 5.53 7.07 5.15 3.19 3.81 7.97 3.74 3.98 7.40 2.32 3.50 
NFPR (stock) 11 7 14 12 9 9 11 10 13 8 12 10 13 11 11 8 
NFPR (P/E) 11 7 16 14 10 11 9 12 13 9 11 10 13 10 11 8 
Notes: NFPR refers to number of firms with positive returns; of course, we have included ‘zero value’. 
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Figure 1. Stock and P/E signaling results during pre-buyback and post-buyback period 
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Figure 2. Stock and P/E signaling results of industrial and service sectors during pre-
buyback and post-buyback period 
